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Abstract 
Katoh, N., J. Koyanagi, M. Ohnishi and T. Ibaraki, Optimal strategies for some team games, 
Discrete Applied Mathematics 35 (1992) 275-291. 
Consider a game between teains A and B, consisting of a sequence of matches, where ach match 
takes place between one player i from A and one player j from B. Given the probability that 
player i wins over player j, we investigate optimal strategies on how to choose a player for the 
next match, for the following two types of team games. The first type assumes that after each 
match, the loser is eliminated from the list of remaining players, while the winner remains in the 
list. The team from which all players are eliminated loses the game. Assuming the Bradley-Terry 
model as the probability model, we first show that the winning probability does not depend on 
the strategy chosen. it is also shown that the Bradley-Terry model is essentially the only model 
for which this strategy independence holds. The second type of game assumes that both players 
are eliminated after each match. In this case, it is shown that choosing a player with equal prob- 
ability is an optimal strategy in the sense of maximizing the expected number of wins of matches, 
provided that information about the order of players in the other teams is not available. The case 
in which a team knows the ordering of the other team is also studied. 
1. Introduction 
This paper considers the following team game played by teams P and B, each con- 
sisting of a specified number of players. Each team selects one member at each stage 
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to play a match. The win or loss of the game is then determined as a result of such 
a sequence of matches. A strategy that each team can take is how to choose a player 
for the next match. Assuming that the winning probability of player i of team A 
against player j of team B is pu, this paper investigates properties of optimal 
strategies. 
Among many team games in the above category, this paper is concerned with the 
following two types. In the first type, the loser of a match is eliminated from the 
list of players, while the winner remains in the list. The team from which all players 
are eliminated loses the game. This type of team game is often adopted in the games 
of “judo”, “kendo” (Japanese fencing), and “go”. Assume that a positive value 
representing his or her strength is associated with each player, and that when player 
i with strength a plays a match against player j with strength b, the probability pij 
of i to win the match is generally given by pii=p(a, b). In particular, if 
p(a, b) = a/(a + b), it is called ths Bradley-Terry model (BT model for short) after 
Bradley and Terry [S] and Bradley [2,3,4], who introduced this to model paired 
comparisons of sensory test to rank samples (e.g., foods) on the basis of the 
preference of panelists. Other applications of the BT model have been discussed by 
Lute [l l] for the probabilistic hoice theory, Fararo [7] for mathematical sociology 
and Takeuchi and Fujino [ 15,161 for a match without a tie in sports. This paper first 
shows that, under the BT model, any strategy is optimal, i.e., the probability for 
a team to win the game does not depend on the strategy chosen. This is a generaliza- 
tion of the result of Katoh and Adachi [lo] who considered the case in which the 
player ordering of each team is determined in advance and the rule of choosing the 
next player from the list is also specified (e.g., in “judo” or “kendo”, a player who 
won a match must play the next match). It is also shown that the BT model is essen- 
tially the only model for which this strategy independence holds. 
In the second type of team game, both players have to leave after each match, 
irrespective of the outcome. If no team has any information on the strategy of the 
other team, it is shown that choosing with equal probability a player for the next 
match maximizes the expected number of wins of matches. This result is a restate- 
ment of Gale’s theorem [8] proved in a different setting. We shall also study the case 
in which a team knows the player ordering of the other team, and derive some prop- 
erties of an optimal strategy under the BT model. 
2. Team game in which only loser leaves the team 
Let A=(l,2,..., M) and B= { 1,2, . . . . N} be the index sets of the players at the 
initial stage. At every stage, each team dynamically selects a player from the list of 
remaining players, and only the loser of the match leaves the team. This is a two- 
person constant-sum sequential game formulated in the following manner (see 
RW 
State space: 
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W= {(SA,SB): SAcA, S&B} - ((0,0)}, 
where SA and SB denote the index sets of remaining players of teams A and B 
respectively. States w = (S,+ S,) with SA = 0 or Se = 0 are absorbing states, implying 
the end of game. 
Action sets: The action set of team A (team B) at state (SA, SB) is S, (S&, i.e., 
an action (i.e., an index) is selected for the next match from the action set of each 
team. 
Transition law: Assume that the strength of k A (Jo B) is denoted by ai (bi), 
and the probability of i to defeat j is given by p(ai, bj). If actions i E SA and j E Se 
are selected at state w= (SA, SE), then state w moves to state w’ with probability 
P(w, i, j, w’), where 
Aad& if w’=(&&- { j)), 
P(w, i, j, w’) = 1 -p(ai, bj), if w’= (SA - {i}, Se), 
0, otherwise. 
Payoff function: If a state (S&J (ISA1 2 1, ISal = 1) moves to (&,0), then 
team A receives 1, while B receives 0. Conversely, if a state (SA, SB) (I& I = 1, 
l&l L 1) moves to (0, S&, A receives 0, while B receives 1. Thus it is easy to see 
that the expected total payoff that team A receives is equal to the winning probabili- 
ty of team A, while the expected total payoff of team B is 1 - (the winning probabili- 
ty of A). 
History: A history h’ at the tth stage is a sequence consisting of all states and ac- 
tions by then: 
h’=(w’,x’, y’, . . . . WI-‘,x1-‘, y’-‘, w’), 
where ti= (Si, Si), xs and ,ti are the state, the action of A and the action of B, 
respectively, at the tih stage. Let H’ denote the set of all possible h’s. 
Dynamic strategy: A dynamic strategy XA for team A is a sequence 
(& n;, l -e, nfi, . . . ), where rri is a conditional probability distribution on Si for a 
given history h’. In other words, zfq(i 1 h’) is the probability that, given h’, team A 
selects player i (E SA) at the tth match. & is defined in a similar manner. Let HA 
(&) denote the set of all possible dynamic strategies for team A (B). 
Let V,, ,(h’) be the expected total payoff that, for a given history h’ (up to the 
tth stage): team A receives under strategies fiA and ng. Team A (B) tries to find a 
strategy ZA (ntg) that maximizes (minimizes) VxA,Jhf). It is known in the theory 
of finite stage two-person constant-sum sequential game (see [9,17]), that the secure 
levels 
max [ min G,ii,Jh’)l (1) R*EI~A RBEIIB 
of team A and 
(2) 
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of team B coincide, and depend only on the current state w’ = (SA, SB) of history ht. 
Furthermore, any maximizer ri of (1) and any minimizer ni of (2) are optimal for 
both teams A and B in the sense that 
‘/n,, .$h’) 5 v,:, .;V+) 5 G,t, .,M’) 
holds for any 7rA en’ and ng E nB. For a history h’ with w’ = (SA, Se), denote the 
value of (1) and (2) by 
v(SA, Se) = max min I/,,,,,(h’) = min max V&&h’) 
n,.#E& ?iBEnB RBeflB %lEnA 
and call it the value of game with initial state (SA,Ss). It is also known that these 
V(SA, Se) satisfy the following optimality equations: 
wAa= 1, 
v(0, sB> = 0, 
for S,#0 and SB#0, 
+ (1 --Mi, bj)) V(SA - Ii L SB)I (3) 
where i’(X) is the set of all probability distributions over set X. Based on a solution 
to (3), an optimal strategy rr: can be constructed by a maximizer a! in the right- 
hand side of (3) at eact state w’= (SA,SB). This means that ni depends only on the 
current state (not the whole history). An optimal strategy rti can be similarly con- 
structed by selecting a minimizp- & 
2.1. Strategy independence under the BT model 
Here we assume the BT model, i.e., 
P(ai*bj)=$, 
i j 
and show that the winning probability is independent of the strategy chosen, i.e., 
any dynamic strategy is optimal. Of course, this result depends on the probability 
model of the game, and we shall show in the next subsection that the strategy in- 
dependence holds only for the BT model. 
Lemma 2.1. For the team game of this section, the optimality equaiions (3) reduce 
to 
b. 
V&, SB) =s v(s,,s,-(i))+~ v~~,4-%s~) 
i J i J 
(4) 
for all i&, and jCSB, 
where SA and SB satisfy SA # 0 and SD z 0 (i.e., (3) is independent of a and p). 
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Proof. This is proved by induction on (m, ni = (iSAl, IS,&. For notational conve- 
nience, let 
(i) m = 1. We consider the case of SA = { 1) without loss of generality. We prove 
V(S/&>= n Q1 
ktz& a1 +b, 
by induction on n = l&l, because this implies 
v(s/j,s~)=-a~ 
al+bj 
bi 
=$ v(S,dg- (j})++b v(nr,S,) 
1 i 1 j 
for any j E SD, i.e., the lemma statement. For n = 1, (6) is obvious. For general n, 
(3) becomes 
= min 
[ ’ ‘(j)(k$&)) PEP&) jES8 
rI a1 = 
k&,al+bk’ 
where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis. 
(ii) n = 1. After proving 
for SD = (l} by an argument similar to (i), we easily obtain 
(7) 
(8) 
for any kSA. 
(iii) For m =2 and n = 2. Assume SA = { 1,2} and SB= { 1,2} without loss of 
generality. From (i) and (ii), Utl become; 
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(by (6) and (8)) 
(=I +bl?!al+b2)(=2+bl)(n2+b2) --’
Since this is invariant under interchauging al and a2 and/or b1 and b2 y Uu does not 
depend on the choice of either i E SA or j E Se. Therefore 
V(SA, Se) = max min 1 C cx(i)fl(j)U, 
I aEP(sA) PEW&f) ifzSA jfz&j I 
=U#j (9) 
holds for any i E SA and j E SB. 
(iv) Assume mr3, nr2 or mz2, nr3. First fo:-any kS, with k#i, and kSB 
with l#j, 
_-!L-- V(S*&- (j,l>)+ bl 
ak+ bi a v(sA- (khh3- tj)) k I 
bj 
+- ( b’ -!%- v(sA-(i)&-{~))+~ ai+bj ak+b, V(Sp .- {i,k)&) k I 
v(sA&- (j,l))+ bi a+b v(sA- (i)&- (())) 
i j 
bj v& -(k)&- (j))‘,+b v(sA - (i,k)&) 
i j 
bl =& v(sA&- {1))+,-+6 v& - (k), Sd 
k I k I 
= ukl (10) 
follows from the inductic q hypothesis. Next we shall show below that Uti = Ukj and 
Uii= Ui,. Consider without loss of generality that m I 3, and choose gE SA with 
g f i, k, and h E Sa with h fj. Applying (10) with k and 1 replaced by g and h respec- 
tively, we have U0 = Ug,, while Ugh = Ukj follows from (10) with i, j and 1 replaced 
by g, h and j respectively. This proves Uii = Ukj. Similarly, (10) and LJi/ = Uk, (apply 
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the above discussion with j replaced by I) yield Uii = Wi,. Consequently, &$ is con- 
stant for all i and j. Similarly to the case of (iii), this proves that (9) holds for any 
i&?, and jESB. q 
Theorem 2.2 (Strategy independence >.For the team game described in this section, 
any zA E HA (any nB E &) is an optimal dyfiamic strategy for team A (B). 
Proof. Since Uij of (5) does not depend on the choice of either t or j as shown in 
the proof of Lemma 2.1, it is clear that any pair of distributions c1 E P(SA) and 
flop respectively attain the max and min of the right-hand side of optimality 
equations (3). The theorem follows from this observation and the known properties 
of optimal strategies tated in conjunction with (1) and (2). I_li 
Some team games have additional rules in carrying out matches. In “judo”, 
“kendo” or “go”, the following rule is often used. Each team determines the order- 
ing of all players in advance. Let (1,2, . . . ) M) and (1,2, . . . , N) be such initial order- 
ings of teams A and B respectively, without loss of generality. Then player 1 of team 
A and player 1 of team B play the first match. The winner must play the next match 
in succession. In general, if (i, i+ 1, . =. ,M) is the ordering of team A just before the 
tth stage, the first player i participates the tth match, and the ordering for the 
(t + l)-st stage is updated as follows. 
(i,i+l,..., M), if i wins, 
(i+l,i+2 ,..., M), if i loses. 
The ordering of team B is similarly updated. This type of team game is called 
’ ‘elimination series’ ’ . In “soft tennis” (a variation of “hard” tennis, which was 
originated in Japan), the winner of a match does not play the next match, but is 
placed in the last position of the list. This type of team game is called “exter- 
minatory series’ ’ . 
Formally, these additional rules are defined as a sequence r = (r’, r2, . . . , r’, . . . ), 
where r’= (Ri, RL) is a pair of mappings which restricts the index sets of players 
for the next match to Ri(h’) (C St \ and RL(h’) (C SL) respectively. Although a 
team game with an additional rule r is not a sequential game as originally stated in 
this section, we can observe that any dynamic str=ategies taken by teams A and B 
are still optimal for such a game because the sets of all dynamic strategies HA 
(respectively &) also include those strategies which obey the additional rule r. 
Corollary 2.3. Even ifan additional rule r as stated above is imposed, the winning 
probability of a team is independent of the chosen zrrategies. 
Corollary 2.3 specialized to elimination and exterminatory series was first shown 
bY WY* 
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2.2. Condition for strategy independence 
In this subsection we consider the converse of Theorem 2.2. That is, the condition 
on the probability model, under which the strategy independence of Theorem 2.2 
holds, is derived, assuming that player &A (j E B) has strength ai (bj), and the 
probability that k A wins a match against je B is p(ai, bj). Although, this p( l , l ) 
is originally defined over domain { (ai, bj) 1 i E A, j E B}, we extend its domain to 
the following symmetric set, 
X=((ai, bj): SEA, jE B} U ((bj,ai): jc B, kA), (11) 
and assume the following for any (a, b) E X : 
O<p(a,b)< 1, (12) 
(13) 
Property (13) states that matches are unbiased and that strengths of players in two 
teams are measured on a common platform. 
With this notation, optimality equations (3) become 
w, St?) = 0, 
V(SA, Se) = max 
for SA+0 and SB+0. 
a(i)P(j)[P(% bj)v(S,+ SB - (j)> 
~P@_dJi~v~~A - i&sB)l 
I 
(14) 
Lemma 2.4. Under the above assumption, the strategy independence of Theown 
2.2 implies that 
holds for any i,i’EA and j,jkB. 
Proof. First note that 
in (14) gives the expected total payoff (the winning probability) of team A when the 
game starts from initial state (SA,SB), and teams A and B use the strategies that 
respectively choose the first players k SA and je Se with probability 1 and obey 
their optimal strategies thereafter. Further note that, as properties (6) and (8) in the 
proof of Lemma 2.1 (replace ai/(ai+ bj) in the proof by p(ai, bj)), 
(16) 
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holds if SA = {i} and 
holds if Se = { j}. 
Now consider the case of SA = { 1,2} and SB= { 1,2}. We have 
(17) 
h =p(adWW/&- (l}j+p(b~,q)V(SA - {l)&) 
=~(al,bl){l-~~b2,a,)p(b2,a2)~ +P(b~,a~)(p(a2,b~)p(a2,62)} 
(by (16) and (17)) 
+p(bl,al)p(a2,bl)p(a2,b2) (by (13)) 
+ P(~I, bl )P&, al )p(az, bd + p(b, aI )pb2, bI )p(a2, b2) 
=~Cal, b)p(al, bdp(a2, &)(p(a2, b,) +p(b+& 
+P~a~~b~)p~b2,a~)p(az,b2j(p~a2,b1)+p(b,,a2j) 
+P(b1,al)p(az,bl)p(a2,b2)(P(al,b2)+p(b2,a,)) (by (13)). (18) 
Similarly, we can obtain U12. From the expressions of U, I and U12, 
(19) 
To prove the assertion, assume without loss of generality that (15) does not hold 
for i= 1, if= 2, j= 1, j’= 2. Then it follows U1, # Ur2 from (19). This means that 
the winning probability of team A from state ({ 1,2}, { 1,2}) becomes different 
depending upon whether team B chooses 1 or 2 with probability 1 for the first 
player. Also, by (12), there are strategies of teams A and B, under which state 
({ 1,21, { 1921) is reachable from initial state (A, I?) with positive probability (e.g., the 
game of “elimination series” with respective initial orderings (M&G 1, . . . ,2,1) of 
teamAand(N,N-l,..., 2,1) of team B). Therefore the winning probability of team 
A (from initial state (A,@) becomes different depending upon whether team B 
chooses 1 or 2 with probability 1 for the next player when state (( 1,2}, { 1,2)) is 
reached. Accordingly, (15) is necessary for the strategy independence. 0 
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We shall now identify the functional form of p(a, b). The following lemma is a 
slight generalization of the well-known result (Subsection 5.1.2 in the English 
translation of AczCl [l]), which derives the stated functional form under the assump- 
tion that the domain X of p( l , l ) is a Cartesian product of some set X’, i.e., 
X=X’xX’. 
Lemma 2.5. Under (12) and (13), p( l , . ) defined over X of (11) satisfies (15) if and 
only if 
p(a, b) = 
f(a) 
f (a)+f (b) 
(20) 
for some function f(m) with f(x)>O, defined over Y=(ai: kA} U (bj: jeB). 
Proof. Define the function r(a, b) over X of (11) by 
r(a, 6) = log 
Aa, b) 
1 -Ha, b) l 
(21) 
Condition (13) implies 
r(a, b) + r(b$ a) = 0 (22) 
for any (a, b) E X, and (15) becomes 
r(ai, bj) + r(ait, bin) + r(&l, ai) -c- r(bj, air) = 0 (23) 
for any i, i’E A and j, j’e B. We shall show below that the general solution of the 
system of functional equations (22) and (23) is 
for some function q( l ) on Y. 
(i) If {ai: &A) fI (bj: je B} f0, then 
aie= bj,= c 
holds for some PEA and j* E B, and r(c, c) = 0 holds by (22). Therefore, (22) and 
(23) imply 
r(ai, bj) = r(ai, C) - r(bj, C) 
for any i E A and je B. Thus, define 
4(x) = r(x, d 
for XE Y, and we have (24). 
(26) 
(ii) (ai: &A} fl {bj:jEB} =0. Fix i’= 1 and j’= 1. Then, from (22) and (23), we 
have 
r(ai,bj)=r(ai,bl)+r(bl,al)-r(bj,al) 
for any k A and j E B. Thus, define a function q( l ) by 
(27) 
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4(x) = 
r(ai,blHr(b19al), if X=Ili for some ieA, 
r(bj, ai ), if x=bj for somejEB, 
and we have (24). 
Now, using 
f(x) = eq@), x E Y, (28) 
p(a, b) is written by (21) and (24) as follows. 
(29) 
In addition, f(x) is positive valued by (28). This proves the “only if” part. 
Conversely, it is clear that any p(a, b) of (20) satisfies (15) as well as (12) and 
(13). q 
In view of this lemma, we conclude that, given p(a, b) for which the strategy in- 
dependence holds, we again obtain the BT model by redefining strength aof a player 
by f (a). This observation together with Theorem 2.2 yields the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.6. Under (12) and (13), the strategy independence of Theorem 2.2 holds 
if and only if the winning probability p(ai, bj) obeys the BT model. 
3. Team game in which both winner and loser leave 
In this model, teams A and B both have Nplayers whose index sets are denoted by , 
A={l,2 ,..., N}, B={l,2 ,..., N}. 
Each player participates a match exactly once. After each match, two players who 
participated the match leave the teams irrespective of the outcome. The objective 
of each team is to maximize the expected number of wins. 
3.1. The case in which the strategy of the opponent is unknown 
First consider the case in which the strategy of the other team is unknown. Assum- 
ing that each team dynamically selects a player for the next match, we derive an op- 
timal strategy that maximizes the expected number of wins. Instead of the BT 
model, we assume here a more general model that the winning probability of plaWrer 
i E A over player j c B is given by pii. Thus 1 -pu is the probability that player j E B 
wins over player i E A. This problem can be formulated as the following two-person 
constant-sum sequential game. 
State space: 
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where & and Se stand for the index sets of remaining players of teams A and B, 
respectively. State w = (0,0) is an absorbing state, implying the end of the game. 
Action sets: The action set of team A (team B) at state (S&&J is SA (S& 
Transition law: If actions k SA and je SB are respectively selected at state 
w = (SA, SD), then state w moves to state w’ with probability P(w, i, j, w’), where 
P(w, i, j, w’) = 
1, if w’=(S,-{i)&-(j)), 
0, otherwise. 
Payoff function: If k SA wins a match, then team A receives 1, while B receives 
0. Otherwise, team B receives 1, while A receives 0. Thus the expected payoff for 
team A (respectively team B) is pij (respectively 1-pii). 
History and strategy are defined in the same way as in Section 2. 
Let ‘/R, .,(h’) be the expected total payoff for team A under strategies ZA and 
ng, for a given histor , !z’ E Hf. Similarly to the case of Section 2, it is known (e.g., 
[9,17]) that there exists a real number V(SA,SB) (the value of game with initial 
state (SA,SB)) for W’ =(SA,SB) of history h’ such that 
V(SA, SB) = max min Vn,,Jht) = min max V&&h’). 
TIAEI~A RBEIYB RBEl7s AAEI~A 
These V(SA,SB) can be obtained by solving the following optimality equations: 
V(0,0) = 0, 
v(sA, sB) = max 
for (SA,SB)+(~,~). 
An optimal strategy ni can be constructed by always selecting a maximizer a! at 
each state w’= (SA, SB), while an optimal policy $ can be similarly constructed by 
selecting a minimizer p. 
Gale [g] discussed a closely related game called “game with finite resource”, 
where “resource” corresponds to players in our case. He considered an asymmetric 
situation that, in our context, only one team (say team A) is allowed to dynamically 
choose a player for the next match, while the other team (team B) must determine 
the ordering of players in advance (i.e., a static strategy). He shows that, if team 
B chooses a static strategy to select one ordering out of N! possibilities with equal 
probability, the expected total payoff is independent of the dynamic strategy of 
team A. Similar properties are also observed in Ross [ 13,141, and Dror [5] for a card 
game named “Goofspiei”. 
The following theorem 02 our dyrzar::ic game is also similar to Gale’s result. In 
fact, its proof can be easily done by slightly modifying Gale’s proof; hence it is 
omitted. 
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Theorem 3.1. For ISAl = l&l =nz 1, 
us*, SB> = - lc CPU 
n iES4 j~s, 
holds. In addition, the following term in the right-hand side of (30) 
(31) 
becomes constant with respect o /I E P(S&, if a(i) = 1 /n for all i E SA , and becomes 
constant with respect to CXE P(SA), if p(j) = I/n for all j&,. (Therefore the 
max min of the right-hand side of (30) is attained if we let cx(i) = 1 /n for i E SA , and 
p(j)= l/n for jES,.) 
3.2. Tire cast in which the ordering of the other team is known 
Assuming the BT model, consider the case in which both teams determine the 
orderings of players before the game starts. Furthermore, in determining the order- 
ing of team A, we assume that the ordering of team B is known to team A in ad- 
vance. In this setting, Theorem 3.1 is no longer true. We shall derive in this 
subsection some properties of an optimal ordering for team A!. Let ai for i E A and 
bj for je 1B be the strength of players as defined in Section 2, and assume 
a1 <a,< l *- <a,, b,<b2<‘=‘<bN (321 
for simplicity. For an ordering (i,, i2, . . . , inr) of team A and (j,, j2, . . . , jN) of team 
B, the expected number of wins of team A is 
N a. 
c 
l/n 
m=l a,,,,+bj”’ 
(33) 
Thus, we can fix the ordering of team B as 
(l,Z l .J+O (34) 
without loss of generality. It should be noted that maximizing (33) is a special case 
of the assignment problem in combinatorial optimization, and an optimal ordering 
can be efficiently obtained by an appropriate algorithm (e.g., [12]). In this subsec- 
tion, we are interested in properties of an optimal ordering. 
Lemma 3.2. For an optimal ordering (i,, i2, . . . , iN) of team A, 
Caik - ai,)(bkb, - aikai,) I 0 
holds for any k, 1 with 15 k < 11 N. 
(35) 
Proof. If we exchange ik and i, in an optimal ordering (il, i2, . . . , i,& the expected 
number of wins must not increase, i.e., 
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ail 4. lk aik a. -+__-_ 0 
aik + bk 
-SO. 
ai,+ bk ail; -I- bl ai,+ bl 
From this we have 
(bk - &)(ai, - ai,)@& - a@,) 50. 
The lemma now follows from assumption bk< b, of (32). 0 
Lemma 3.3. For any subsequence tx= (ik,, ikz9 . .. , ik,) of an optimal ordering 
(il, it , . . . , iN) of team A, such that 
indices 
Proof. 
ik, = mm ik,,,r 
lsmcn 
ik, for m42, . ..)_ rl are monotone decreasing in m (cf. (32)). 
Because objective function (33) is additive, maximization of the partial sum 
over all permutations 0 = (Go, G3; . . . , Gn) of (ikr9 ikzS . .. , ikn) can be done in- 
dependently of other components in the whole sequence, where (kr, k2, . . . , kn) is the 
subsequence of (1,2, . . . , N) of team B corresponding to (ik,, ikz9 . .. , ik,). Therefore 
it suffices to show the following: if it = N in an optimal ordering (iI, i2, . . . , inr) of 
. 
team A, then (il,r2 ,..., inr)=(N,N-1 ,..., 1). 
Assume i,., < iq for some p c q. By Lemma 3.2, we have 
MN- a$(br bp - a@i,) 1: 0, 
(ai, - aiq)(bPb, - aiPa$ L 0. 
By aiP<aiq< aN (recah (32)), this implies 
b,bP-aNaiPZO, 
bPbq - aiPaiq 5 0. 
On the other hand, bl bP< b,,bq and aiPai4 <aNai, must hold by bl C b4 and aiqC aN. 
This is a contradiction. Cl 
Lemma 3.4. For asiy subsequence a = (ik,, i& . . . , ikJ of an optimal ordering 
(4, i2. . l l l , iN) 0-f team A, at kaSt one of the following four cases occurs. 
ik, = min ik,“, (36) 
lsmln 
ik, = min ik,, 
1 Imcn 
(37) 
ik, = max ik,;;) 
15mln 
(38) 
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ik, = max ik,n. 
lsmln 
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In addition, (38) implies (37). 
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 3.3, vz only consider the case of n = N, 
i.e., (i&, . . . . ik,)=(if,i2, . . . . iN). 
If N= 1,2, the lemma is obvious. For N= 3, the optimal ordering not satisfying 
the condition of the lemma is (3,1,2) only (this satisfies (38) but not (37)). However, 
this does not satisfy the condition of Lemma 3,3, and hence it is not optimal. For 
N=4, an ordering which does not satisfy this lemma but satisfies the condition of 
Lemma 3.3 is (2,1,4,3) only. From Lemma 3.2, we have 
b2b3 -a,a4c0 =$ b2/a, I a4/b3, (43) 
Using (44), (43), (40), (41) in this order, 
follows. Thus, consider the case of 
b&/a3 = a4/b3 = b2/al = a2/bl = c. 
Then from (42), 
holds. This implies CI 1, and hence al = b/c> cb, = a2, which contradicts (32). 
For N>-i, if we consider an ordering which does not satisfy this lemma but 
satisfies the condition of Lemma 3.3, there exist I, m with 1 c I< m <IV, ir= 1 and 
. 
I, =N. Hence, applying a similar argument as in A/--- 4 to il, i,, im, iN, we can 
derive a contradiction. 
The last assertion of the lemma directly follows from Lemma 3.3. 0 
This lemma states that for any subsequence a = (ik,, ikz, . . . , ik,) of an optimal se- 
quence of team A, at least one of the following four matches must take place: 
team A team B 
the weakest playe: in a! vs the weakest player in /? 
the weakest player in cy vs the strongest player in p 
the strongest player in a vs the weakest player in p 
the strongest player in a vs the strongest player in p, 
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where fl is the corresponding subsequence (k,, k2, . . . , k,) of team B. 
When N= 3, ordering (3,1,2) can only be eliminated by Lemma 3.3. I-lowever, 
vvhen N=4, the following 11 out of 4. I= 24 possible orderings are excluded by Lem- 
mas 3.3 and 3.4: 
(1,4953), (2,1,4,3), (2,4,1,3), (3,1,2,4), (3,1,4,2), (3,4,1,2), 
(49 1929 3), (4,‘. 3,2), (4,2,1,3), (4,2,3, l), (4,3,1,2). 
The fraction of orderings to be excluded by Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 becomes ignificant 
as N becomes large. 
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